The change-point detection problem seeks to identify distributional changes at an unknown changepoint k * in a stream of data. This problem appears in many important practical settings involving personal data, including biosurveillance, fault detection, finance, signal detection, and security systems. The field of differential privacy offers data analysis tools that provide powerful worst-case privacy guarantees. We study the statistical problem of change-point detection through the lens of differential privacy. We give private algorithms for both online and offline change-point detection, analyze these algorithms theoretically, and provide empirical validation of our results.
Introduction
The change-point detection problem seeks to identify distributional changes at an unknown change-point k * in a stream of data. The estimated change-point should be consistent with the hypothesis that the data are initially drawn from pre-change distribution P0 but from post-change distribution P1 starting at the change-point. This problem appears in many important practical settings, including biosurveillance, fault detection, finance, signal detection, and security systems. For example, the CDC may wish to detect a disease outbreak based on real-time data about hospital visits, or smart home IoT devices may want to detect changes changes in activity within the home. In both of these applications, the data contain sensitive personal information.
The field of differential privacy offers data analysis tools that provide powerful worst-case privacy guarantees. Informally, an algorithm that is -differentially private ensures that any particular output of the algorithm is at most e more likely when a single data entry is changed. In the past decade, the theoretical computer science community has developed a wide variety of differentially private algorithms for many statistical tasks. The private algorithms most relevant to this work are based on the simple output perturbation principle that to produce an -differentially private estimate of some statistic on the database, we should add to the exact statistic noise proportional to ∆/ , where ∆ indicates the sensitivity of the statistic, or how much it can be influenced by a single data entry.
We study the statistical problem of change-point problem through the lens of differential privacy. We give private algorithms for both online and offline change-point detection, analyze these algorithms theoretically, and then provide empirical validation of these results.
Related work
The change-point detection problem originally arose from industrial quality control, and has since been applied in a wide variety of other contexts including climatology [LR02] , econometrics [BP03] , and DNA analysis [ZS12] . The problem is studied both in the offline setting, in which the algorithm has access to the full dataset X = {x1, . . . , xn} up front, and in the online setting, in which data points arrive one at a time X = {x1, . . .}. Change-point detection is a canonical problem in statistics that has been studied for nearly a century; selected results include [She31, Pag54, Shi63, Rob66, Lor71, Pol85, Pol87, Mou86, Lai95, Lai01, Kul01, Mei06, Mei08, Mei10, Cha17].
Our approach is inspired by the commonly used Cumulative Sum (CUSUM) procedure [Pag54] . It follows the generalized log-likelihood ratio principle, calculating (k) = n i=k log P1(xi) P0(xi)
for each k ∈ [n] and declaring that a change occurs if and only if (k) ≥ T for MLEk = argmax k (k) and appropriate threshold T > 0. The existing change-point literature works primarily in the asymptotic setting when k * n /n → r for some r ∈ (0, 1) as n → ∞ (see, e.g., [Hin70, Car88] ). In contrast, we consider finite databases and provide the first accuracy guarantees for the MLE from a finite sample (n < ∞).
In offering the first algorithms for private change-point detection, we primarily use two powerful tools from the differential privacy literature. ReportMax [DR14] calculates noisy approximations of a stream of queries on the database and reports which query produced the largest noisy value. We instantiate this with partial log-likelihood queries to produce a private approximation of the the change-point MLE in the offline setting. AboveThresh [DNR + 09] calculates noisy approximations of a stream of queries on the database iteratively and aborts as soon as a noisy approximation exceeds a specified threshold. We extend our offline results to the harder online setting, in which a bound on k * is not known a priori, by using AboveThresh to identify a window of fixed size n in which a change is likely to have occurred so that we can call our offline algorithm at that point to estimate the true change-point.
Our results
We use existing tools from differential privacy to solve the change-point detection problem in both offline and online settings, neither of which have been studied in the private setting before.
Private offline change-point detection. We develop an offline private change-point detection algorithm OfflinePCPD (Algorithm 3) that is accurate under one of two assumptions about the distributions from which data are drawn. As is standard in the privacy literature, we give accuracy guarantees that bound the additive error of our estimate of the true change-point with high probability. Our accuracy theorem statements (Theorems 5 and 7) also provide guarantees for the non-private estimator for comparison. Since traditional statistics typically focuses on the the asymptotic consistency and unbiasedness of the estimator, ours are the first finite-sample accuracy guarantees for the standard (non-private) MLE. As expected, MLE accuracy decreases with the sensitivity of the measured quantity but increases as the pre-and post-change distribution grow apart. Interestingly, it is constant with respect to the size of the database. In providing MLE bounds alongside accuracy guarantees for our private algorithms, we are able to quantify the cost of privacy as roughly DKL(P0||P1)/ .
We are able to prove -differential privacy under the first distributional assumption, which is that the measured quantity has bounded sensitivity ∆( ), by instantiating the general-purpose ReportMax algorithm from the privacy literature with our log-likelihood queries (Theorem 4). Importantly and in contrast to our accuracy results, the distributional assumption need only apply to the hypothesized distributions from which data are drawn; privacy holds for arbitrary input databases. We offer a limited privacy guarantee for our second distributional assumption, ensuring that if an individual data point is drawn from one of the two hypothesized distributions, redrawing that data from either of the distributions will not be detected, regardless of the composition of the rest of the database (Theorem 6).
Private online change-point detection. In OnlinePCPD (Algorithm 4), we extend our online results to the offline setting by using the AboveThresh framework to first identify a window in which the change is likely to have happened and then call the offline algorithm to identify a more precise approximation of when it occurred. Standard -differential privacy under our first distributional assumption follows from composition of the underlying privacy mechanisms (Theorem 8).
1 Accuracy of our online mechanism relies on appropriate selection of the threshold that identifies a window in which a change-point has likely occurred, at which point the error guarantees are inherited from the offline algorithm (Theorem 9).
Empirical validation. Finally, we run several Monte Carlo experiments to validate our theoretical results for both the online and offline settings. We consider data drawn from Bernoulli and Gaussian distributions, which satisfy our first and second distributional assumptions, respectively. Our offline experiments are summarized in Figure 1 , which shows that change-point detection is easier when P0 and P1 are further apart and harder when the privacy requirement is stronger ( is smaller). Additionally, these experiments enhance our theoretical results, finding that OfflinePCPD performs well even when we relax the assumptions required for our theoretical accuracy bounds by running our algorithm on imperfect hypotheses P0 and P1 that are closer together than the true distributions from which data are drawn. Figure 2 shows that OnlinePCPD also performs well, consistent with our theoretical guarantees.
Preliminaries
Our work considers the statistical problem of change-point detection through the lens of differential privacy. Section 2.1 defines the change-point detection problem, and Section 2.2 describes the differentially private tools that will be brought to bear.
Change-point background
Let X = {x1, . . . , xn} be n real-valued data points. The change-point detection problem is parametrized by two distributions, P0 and P1. The data points in X are hypothesized to initially be sampled i.i.d. from P0, but at some unknown change time k * ∈ [n], an event may occur (e.g., epidemic disease outbreak) and change the underlying distribution to P1. The goal of a data analyst is to announce that a change has occurred as quickly as possible after k * . Since the xi may be sensitive information-such as individuals' medical information or behaviors inside their home-the analyst will wish to announce the change-point time in a privacy-preserving manner.
In the standard non-private offline change-point literature, the analyst wants to test the null hypothesis H0 : k * = ∞, where x1, . . . , xn ∼ iid P0, against the composite alternate hypothesis H1 : k * ∈ [n], where x1, . . . , x k * −1 ∼ iid P0 and x k * , . . . , xn ∼ iid P1. The log-likelihood ratio of k
The maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) of the change time k * is given bŷ
When X is clear from context, we will simply write (k) andk. An important quantity in our accuracy analysis will be the Kullback-Leibler distance between probability distributions P0 and P1, defined as DKL(P1||P0) =
]. We always use log to refer to the natural logarithm, and when necessary, we interpret log 0 0 = 0. We will measure the additive error of our estimations of the true change point as follows.
Definition 1 ((α, β)-accuracy). A change-point detection algorithm that produces a change-point estimator k(X) where a distribution change occurred at time k
where the probability is taken over randomness of the algorithm and sampling of X.
Differential privacy background
Differential privacy bounds the maximum amount that a single data entry can affect analysis performed on the database. Two databases X, X are neighboring if they differ in at most one entry.
Definition 2 (Differential Privacy [DMNS06] ). An algorithm M : R n → R is ( , δ)-differentially private if for every pair of neighboring databases X, X ∈ R n , and for every subset of possible outputs S ⊆ R,
If δ = 0, we say that M is -differentially private.
One common technique for achieving differential privacy is by adding Laplace noise. The Laplace distribution with scale b is the distribution with probability density function: Lap(x|b) =
We will write Lap(b) to denote the Laplace distribution with scale b, or (with a slight abuse of notation) to denote a random variable sampled from Lap(b).
The sensitivity of a function or query f is defined as ∆(f ) = max neighbors X,X |f (X) − f (X )|. The Laplace Mechanism of [DMNS06] takes in a function f , database X, and privacy parameter , and outputs f (X) + Lap(∆(f )/ ).
Our algorithms rely on two existing differentially private algorithms, ReportMax [DR14] and AboveThresh [DNR + 09] . The ReportMax algorithm takes in a collection of queries, computes a noisy answer to each query, and returns the index of the query with the largest noisy value. We use this as the framework for our offline private change-point detector OfflinePCPD in Section 3 to privately select the time k with the highest log-likelihood ratio (k).
Algorithm 1 Report Noisy Max : ReportMax(X, ∆, {f 1 , . . . , f m }, )
Input: database X, set of queries {f 1 , . . . , f m } each with sensitivity ∆, privacy parameter
The AboveThresh algorithm, first introduced by [DNR + 09] and refined to its current form by [DR14] , takes in a potentially unbounded stream of queries, compares the answer of each query to a fixed noisy threshold, and halts when it finds a noisy answer that exceeds the noisy threshold. We use this algorithm as a framework for our online private change-point detector OnlinePCPD in Section 4 when new data points arrive online in a streaming fashion.
Algorithm 2 Above Noisy Threshold: AboveThresh(X, ∆, {f 1 , f 2 , . . .}, T, ) Input: database X, stream of queries {f 1 , f 2 , . . .} each with sensitivity ∆, threshold T , privacy parameter
Theorem 3 ([DNR + 09]). For any sequence of m queries f1, . . . , fm with sensitivity ∆ such that |{i < m : fi(X) ≥ T −α}| = 0, AboveThresh outputs with probability at least 1−β a stream of a1, . . . , am ∈ { , ⊥} such that ai = ⊥ for every i ∈ [m] with f (i) < T − α and ai = for every i ∈ [m] with f (i) > T + α as long as α ≥ 8∆ log(2m/β) .
Concentration inequalities
Our proofs will use the following bounds.
Lemma 1 (Ottaviani's inequality [VDVW96] ). For independent random variables U1, . . . , Um, for
, and for λ1, λ2 > 0, we have
.
If we additionally assume the Uj above are i.i.d. with mean 0 and take values from an interval of bounded length L, we can apply Hoeffding's inequality for the following corollary:
Corollary 2. For independent and identically distributed random variables U1, . . . , Um with mean zero strictly bounded by an interval of length L and for
Offline private change-point detection
In this section, we investigate the differentially private change point detection problem in the setting that n data points X = {x1, . . . , xn} are known to the algorithm in advance. Given two hypothesized distributions P0 and P1, our algorithm OfflinePCPD privately approximates the MLEk of the change time k * . We provide accuracy bounds for both the MLE and the output of our algorithm under two different assumptions about the distributions from which the data are drawn, summarized in Table 1 . The expressions ∆( ), A δ , C, and CM are defined in (4), (5), (17), (18), resp.
The first assumption essentially requires that P1(x)/P0(x) cannot be arbitrarily large or arbitrarily small for any x. We note that this assumption is not satisfied by several important families of distributions, including Gaussians. The second assumption, motivated by the δ > 0 relaxation of differential privacy, instead requires that the x for which this log ratio exceeds some bound A δ have probability mass at most δ.
Although the accuracy of OfflinePCPD only holds under the change-point model's alternate hypothesis H1, it is -differentially private for any hypothesized distributions P0, P1 with finite ∆( ) and privacy parameters > 0, δ = 0 regardless of the distributions from which X is drawn. We offer a similar but somewhat weaker privacy guarantee when ∆( ) is infinite but A δ is finite, which roughly states that a data point sampled from either P0 or P1 can be replaced with a fresh sample from either P0 or P1 without detection.
Offline algorithm
Our proposed offline algorithm OfflinePCPD applies the report noisy max algorithm [DR14] to the change-point problem by adding noise to partial log-likelihood ratios (k) used to estimate the change point MLEk. The algorithm chooses Laplace noise parameter A/ depending on input hypothesized distributions P0, P1 and privacy parameters , δ and then outputs
Our algorithm can be easily modified to additionally output an approximation of (k) and incur 2 privacy cost by composition.
Algorithm 3 Offline private change-point detector : OfflinePCPD(X, P 0 , P 1 , , δ, n)
In the change-point or statistical process control (SPC) literature, when the pre-and post-change distributions are unknown in practical settings, researchers often choose hypotheses P0, P1 with the smallest justifiable distance. While it is easier to detect and accurately estimate a larger change, larger changes are often associated with a higher-sensitivity MLE, requiring more noise (and therefore additional error) to preserve privacy. We propose that practitioners using our private change point detection algorithm choose input hypotheses accordingly. This practical setting is considered in our numerical studies, presented in Section 5.
In the case that δ = 0, we sample Laplace noise directly proportional to the sensitivity of the partial log-likelihood ratios we compute:
The algorithm should not be invoked with δ = 0 unless ∆( ) is finite. In the case that has infinite sensitivity, we instead allow the user to select a privacy parameter δ > 0 and identify a value A δ for which most values of x ∼ P0, P1 have bounded log-likelihood ratio:
As a concrete canonical example, ∆( ) is unbounded for two Gaussian distributions, but A δ is bounded for Gaussians with different means as follows:
, where Φ is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the standard normal distribution.
Theoretical properties under the uniform bound assumption
In this subsection, we prove privacy and accuracy of OfflinePCPD when δ = 0 and P0, P1 are such that ∆( ) is finite. Note that if ∆( ) is infinite, then the algorithm will simply add noise with infinite scale and will still be differentially private.
Theorem 4. For arbitrary data X, OfflinePCPD(X, P0, P1, , 0) is ( , 0)-differentially private.
Proof. Privacy follows by instantiation of ReportMax [DR14] with queries (k) for k ∈ [n], which have sensitivity A = ∆( ); this proof is included for completeness.
Fix any two neighboring databases X, X that differ on index j. For any k ∈ [n], denote the respective partial log-likelihood ratios as (k) and (k). By (1), we have
Next, for a given 1 ≤ i ≤ n, fix Z−i, a draw from [Lap(A/ )] n−1 used for all the noisy log likelihood ratio values except the ith one. We will bound from above and below the ratio of the probabilities that the algorithm outputsk = i on inputs X and X . Define the minimum noisy value in order for i to be select with X:
Hence, Z i ≥ Z * i + A ensures that the algorithm outputs i on input X , and the theorem follows from the following inequalities for any fixed Z−i, with probabilities over the choice of Zi ∼ Lap(A/ ).
Next we provide accuracy guarantees of the standard (non-private) MLEk and the outputk of our private algorithm OfflinePCPD when the data are drawn from P0, P1 with true change point k * ∈ (1, n). By providing both bounds, Theorem 5 quantifies the cost of requiring privacy in change point detection.
Our result for the standard (non-private) MLE is the first finite-sample accuracy guarantee for this estimator. Such non-asymptotic properties have not been previously studied in traditional statistics, which typically focuses on consistency and unbiasedness of the estimator, with less attention to the convergence rate. We show that the additive error of the MLE is constant with respect to the sample size, which means that the convergence rate is OP (1). That is, it converges in probability to the true change-point k * in constant time. Note that accuracy depends on two measures A and C of the distances between distributions P0 and P1. Accuracy both of MLEk and OfflinePCPD outputk is best for distributions for which A = ∆( ) is small relative to KL-divergence, which is consistent with the intuition that larger changes are easier to detect but output sensitivity degrades the robustness of the estimator and requires more noise for privacy, harming accuracy.
A technical challenge that arises in proving accuracy of the private estimator is that the xi are not identically distributed when the true change-point k * ∈ (1, n], and so the partial log-likelihood ratios (k) are dependent across k. Hence we need to investigate the impact of adding i.i.d. noise draws to a sequence of (k) that may be neither independent nor identically distributed. Fortunately, the differences (k) − (k + 1) = log
are piecewise i.i.d. This property is key in our proof. Moreover, we show that we can divide the possible outputs of the algorithm into regions that of doubling size with exponentially decreasing probability of being selected by the algorithm, resulting in accuracy bounds that are independent of the number of data points n.
Theorem 5. For hypotheses P0, P1 such that ∆( ) < ∞ and n data points X drawn from P0, P1 with true change time k * ∈ (1, n], the MLEk is (α, β)-accurate for any β > 0 and
For hypotheses and data drawn this way with privacy parameter > 0, OfflinePCPD(X, P0, P1, , 0, n) is (α, β)-accurate for any β > 0 and
In both expressions, A = ∆( ) and C = min{DKL(P1||P0), DKL(P0||P1)}.
Proof. Our goal is to find some expression for α such that we can bound the probability of the bad event that OfflinePCPD outputsk such that |k − k * | > α with probability at most β, where k * is the true change point. The first half of our analysis will yield another bound giving accuracy of the MLEk.
Our proof is structured around the following observation. The algorithm only outputs a particular incorrectk = k * if there exists some k in with (k) + Z k > (k * ) + Z k * for a set of random noise values {Z k } k∈[n] selected by the algorithm. For the algorithm to output an incorrect value, there must either be a k that nearly beats the true change point on the noiseless data or there must be a k that receives much more noise than k * . Intuitively, this captures the respective scenarios that unusual data causes non-private ERM to perform poorly and that unusual noise draws causes our private algorithm to perform poorly.
Given some true change-point k * and error tolerance α > 0, we can partition the set of bad possible outputs k into sub-intervals of exponentially increasing size as follows. For i ≥ 1, let
Then for any range-specific thresholds ti for i ≥ 1, our previous observations allow us to bound the probability of the bad event as follows:
We bound each term in the above expression separately for ti = 2 i−2 αC. For accuracy of the non-private MLE, we will set α to ensure that the first term is at most β. For accuracy of the private algorithm, we will set α to ensure that each term is at most β/2. The first and more difficult task requires us to reason about the probability that the log-likelihood ratios for the data are not too far away from their expectation. Although the (k) are not independent, their pairwise differences (k + 1) − (k) are, so we can apply our corollary of Ottaviani's inequality to bound the probability that (k) significantly exceeds (k * ) by appropriately defining several random variables corresponding to a data stream X drawn according to the change-point model.
Specifically, we can decompose the empirical log-likelihood difference between the true change-point k * and any candidate k into the sum of i.i.d. random variables with mean zero and the expected value of this difference as follows:
We also define random variable Sm to denote the sum of m i.i.d. random variables as follows, noting that Sm is distributed like k * −1 j=k * +m Uj for m < 0 and like
With these random variables, we bound each term in the first set of terms in (9) for any i ≥ 1 and threshold ti = 2 i−2 αC as follows:
where (13) follows from an application of Corollary 2 with λ1 = λ2 = 2 i−3 αC and L = A, and the denominator can be simplified as in (14) under the assumption that α ≥ 8A 2 log 4 C 2 to simplify the denominator, which is satisfied by our final bounds.
We now consider the sum of these terms over all i, which will be needed for the final bound on Equation (9). We note that this sum is bounded above by a geometric series with ratio exp(−αC 2 /(8A 2 )) since 2 i−1 ≥ i, yielding the second inequality. Then the same assumed lower bound on α is used to simplify the denominator as in (14):
The first term in (8) in the theorem statement ensures that the expression above is bounded by β/2, as is required for the private algorithm.
For non-private MLE, we bound each term in the first set of terms in (9) for any i ≥ 1 and threshold ti = 0 as follows:
Summing these terms over all i,
For α as in (7) in the theorem statement, the expression above is bounded by β, completing the accuracy proof for the non-private MLE. Next we bound the second set of terms in (9), controlling the probability that large noise draws cause large inaccuracies for the private algorithm. Since each Z k and Z k * are independent draws from a Laplace distribution with parameter A/ , this bound follows from a union bound over all indices in Ri and the definition of the Laplace distribution:
Then by summing over all ranges and assuming in (16) that α ≥ 4A ln 2 C to simplify the denominator, we obtain a bound on the probability of large noise applied to any possible k far from k * .
i≥1
Pr[max
Since x/2 ≥ ln x, requiring α ≥ 4A log(16/β) C suffices to ensure that (16) is at most β/2 as required. By Inequality 9, this guarantees that Pr[|k − k * | > α] ≤ β for the assumed ranges of α captured in Equation (8) in the theorem statement, completing the proof.
Relaxing uniform bound assumptions
In this subsection, we prove accuracy and a limited notion of privacy for OfflinePCPD when δ > 0 and P0, P1 are such that A δ is finite. Since we are no longer able to uniformly bound log P1(x)/P0(x), these accuracy results include worse constants than those in Section 3.2, but the relaxed assumption about P0, P1 makes the results applicable to a wider range of distributions, including Gaussian distributions (see Example 1). Note of course that for some pairs of very different distributions, such as distributions with non-overlapping supports, the assumption that A δ < ∞ may still fail. A true change point k * can always be detected with perfect accuracy given x k * −1 and x k * , so we should not expect to be able to offer any meaningful privacy guarantees for such distributions.
By similar rationale, relaxing the uniform bound assumption means that we may have a single data point xj that dramatically increases (k) for k ≥ j, so we cannot add noise proportional to ∆( ) and privacy no longer follows from that of ReportMax. Instead we offer a weaker notion of privacy in Theorem 6 below. As with the usual definition of differential privacy, we guarantee that the output of our algorithm is similarly distributed on neighboring databases, only our notion of neighboring databases depends on the hypothesized distributions. Specifically, the a single entry in X drawn from either P0 or P1 may be replaced without detection by another entry drawn from either P0 or P1, even if the rest of the database is arbitrary.
Theorem 6. For any , δ > 0, any hypotheses P0, P1 such that A δ < ∞, any index j ∈ [n], any i, i ∈ {0, 1}, and any x1, . . . , xj−1, xj+2, . . . , xn, let Xi = {x1, . . . , xn} denote the random variable with xj ∼ Pi and let X i = {x1, . . . , xj−1, x j , xj+1, . . . , xn} denote the random variable with x j ∼ P i . Then for any S ⊆ [n], we have
where the probabilities are over the randomness of the algorithm and of Xi, X i .
Proof. Define the event that the log-likelihood ratios of xj, x j as in the theorem statement are bounded by A δ as follows:
Letk = OfflinePCPD(Xi, P0, P1, , δ, n),k = OfflinePCPD(X i , P0, P1, , δ, n). Then by Theorem 4 and the observation that Pr[E 
Allowing ∆( ) to be infinite precludes our use of Hoeffding's inequality as in Theorem 5. The main idea in the proof, however, can be salvaged by decomposing the change into a change from P0 to the average distribution (P0 + P1)/2 and then the average distribution to P1. Correspondingly, we will use CM , an alternate distance measure between P0 and P1, defined below next to C from the previous section for comparison:
Because (2Pi)/(P0 + P1) ≤ 2, we have 0 ≤ DKL(Pi||(P0 + P1)/2) ≤ log 2, and thus the constant CM in (18) is well-defined.
Theorem 7. For δ > 0 and hypotheses P0, P1 such that A δ < ∞ and n data points X drawn from P0, P1 with true change time k * ∈ (1, n), the MLEk is (α, β)-accurate for any β > 0 and
For hypotheses and data drawn this way with privacy parameter > 0, OfflinePCPD(X, P0, P1, , δ, n) is (α, β)-accurate for any β > 0 and
In both expressions, A = A δ and CM = min DKL(P0||
), DKL(P1||
Proof. The general framework of this proof is similar to that of Theorem 5, but the main difference is that Hoeffding's inequality is not applicable in this general setting, since we allow ∆( ) to be unbounded. The main idea in this proof is to consider the alternative log-likelihood ratio using the average distribution (P0 + P1)/2, in which Bernstein inequality can be applied. Following the notation from Theorem 5, given some true change-point k * and error tolerance α > 0, we can partition the set of bad possible outputs k into sub-intervals of exponentially increasing size as follows. For i ≥ 1, let
Then for any range-specific thresholds ti for i ≥ 1, we will still bound the probability of the bad event as follows:
We will re-define Uj to denote the i.i.d random variables with mean zero by the alternative log-likelihood, and Sm to denote the sum of m i.i.d Uj as follows:
With these random variables, we can bound the empirical log-likelihood difference between the true change-point k * and any candidate k by
Then we bound each term in the first set of terms in (21) for any i ≥ 1 and threshold ti = 2 i−1 αCM as follows:
(23)
where (23) follows from an application of Corollary 4 with λ1 = λ2 = 2 i−3 αCM and v = 4. To apply Corollary 4, we first need to check the conditions of Bernstein inequality. We shall show that for any j,
and then all conditions of Bernstein inequality are fulfilled. To prove this, let Yj be the i.i.d. alternative log-likelihood ratio as follows:
, j ≥ k * Then it suffices to note that
, and the fact that e −C M ∈ [1, 2].
It follows from direct calculations that the condition α ≥
, which is used to simplify the denominator as in (24). We now consider the sum of these terms over all i, which will be needed for the final bound on Equation (21).
The first term in (20) in the theorem statement ensures that the expression above is bounded by β/2, as is required for the private algorithm.
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For α as in (19) in the theorem statement, the expression above is bounded by β, completing the accuracy proof for the non-private MLE.
The calculations for the probability bounds for the Laplace noise terms are the same as those in Theorem 5 with C substituted by 2CM , which ends up with a probability no more than another β/2 under the condition α ≥ 
Online private change-point detection
In this section, we give a new differentially private algorithm for change point detection in the online setting, OnlinePCPD. In this setting, the algorithm initially receives n data points x1, . . . , xn and then continues to receive data points one at a time. As before, the goal is to privately identify an approximation of the time k * when the data change from distribution P0 to P1. Additionally, we want to identify this change shortly after it occurs.
Our offline algorithm is not directly applicable because we do not know a priori how many points must arrive before a true change point occurs. To resolve this, OnlinePCPD works like AboveThresh, determining after each new data entry arrives whether it is likely that a change occurred in the most recent n entries. When OnlinePCPD detects a sufficiently large (noisy) partial log likelihood ratio (k) = j i=k log
, it calls OfflinePCPD to privately determine the most likely change pointk in the window {xj−n+1, . . . , xj}.
Privacy of OnlinePCPD is immediate from composition of AboveThresh and OfflinePCPD, each with privacy loss /2. As before, accuracy requires X to be drawn from P0, P1 with some true change point k * . This algorithm also requires a suitable choice of T to guarantee that OfflinePCPD is called for a window of data that actually contains k * . Specifically, T should be large enough that the algorithm is unlikely to call OfflinePCPD when j < k * but small enough so that it is likely to call OfflinePCPD by time j = k * + n/2. When both of these conditions hold, we inherit the accuracy of OfflinePCPD, with an extra log n factor arising from the fact that the data are no longer distributed exactly as in the change-point model after conditioning on calling OfflinePCPD in a correct window.
With our final bounds, we note that n A C log(k * /β) suffices for existence of a suitable threshold, and an analyst must have a reasonable approximation of k * in order to choose such a threshold. Otherwise, the accuracy bound itself has no dependence on the change-point k * .
Algorithm 4 Online private change-point detector : OnlinePCPD(X, P 0 , P 1 , , n, T )
Input: database X, distributions P 0 , P 1 , privacy parameter , starting size n, threshold
Theorem 9. For hypotheses P0, P1 such that ∆( ) < ∞, a stream of data points X with starting size n drawn from P0, P1 with true change time k * ≥ n/2, privacy parameter > 0, and threshold T ∈ [TL, TU ] with
we have that OnlinePCPD(X, P0, P1, , n, T ) is (α, β) accurate for any β > 0 and
In the above expressions, A = ∆( ) and C = min{DKL(P0||P1), DKL(P1||P0)}.
Proof. We first give a range [TL, TU ] of thresholds that ensure that except with probability β/4, the randomly sampled data stream satisfies the following two conditions:
When these conditions are satisfied, the AboveThresh guarantee ensures that except with probability β/4, the randomness of the online algorithm ensures that it calls the offline algorithm on a window of data containing the true change-point. Then we will argue that our overall accuracy follows from the offline guarantee, where we will allow failure probability β/2. We will get the first condition by taking a union bound over all windows tested before the change point of the probability that the maximum log-likelihood max k (k) for n elements X = (x1, . . . , xn) sampled from P0 exceed a given threshold. To bound this probability, we first define the following random variables.
Uj
We note that each (k) is the sum of i.i.d. random variables, and that the maximum log-likelihood over m consecutive elements is equal in distribution to max k∈[m] S k − kDKL(P0||P1). This yields the first inequality below. Inequality (31) comes from applying Corollary 2 with λ1 = λ2 = 2 i−2 C + t/2 and interval length L = A.
Pr max
Inequalities (32) and (33) follow by plugging in t = 2A 2 log
, giving Inequality (32), and that the series is increasing exponentially in i, so we can collapse the sum with another factor of 2 by considering only i = 1 as in Inequality (33). This value of t also ensures that the bound of Inequality (33) is at most β/(8k * ). Taking the union bound over all the windows prior to the change-point, this shows that Condition 1 holds for TL = 2A 2 log 64k * β − C + α except with probability β/8.
To show that the second condition holds except with additional probability β/8, we consider the window of data with the first half of data drawn from P0 and the second half drawn from P1 and bound the probability that (k * ) in this window is less than a given threshold as follows. We note that (k * ) is the sum of n/2 i.i.d. random variables, so we define mean-zero random variables Vj = − log
+ DKL(P1||P0) and bound their sum using Hoeffding's inequality:
n log(8/β) in this final expression ensures that (34) ≤ β/8. This ensures that Condition 2 is satisfied except with probability β/8 for TU = nC/2 − A 2 log(8/β) − α .
Then we can instantiate the AboveThresh accuracy guarantee with privacy parameter /2 and accuracy parameter β/4 to ensure that for α = 16A log(8k * /β) when Conditions 1 and 2 are satisfied, AboveThresh will identify a window containing the true change-point except with probability β/4. Combining this with the β/4 probability that Conditions 1 and 2 fail to hold when T ∈ [TL, TU ], we get that OnlinePCPD calls OfflinePCPD in a window containing the change-point except with probability β/2 over the randomness of the data and of the online portion of the algorithm.
We next instantiate OfflinePCPD with appropriate parameters to ensure that conditioned on being called in the correct window, it will output ak that is within α of the true change-point k * with probability at most β/2. We can then complete the proof by taking a union bound over all the failure probabilities.
Our offline accuracy guarantee requires data points sampled i.i.d. from P0 before the change point and from P1 thereafter, so it remains to show that conditioning on the event that we call the offline algorithm in a correct window does not harm the accuracy guarantee too much. For a window size n, change-point k * , stream X of at least k * + n/2 data points, set of random coins required by OnlinePCPD and its call to OfflinePCPD, and a stopping index k > n/2, let N (k) denote the event that OnlinePCPD calls OfflinePCPD on a window centered at k, and let F (k) denote the event that OfflinePCPD on the window centered at k fails to output an approximation within α of k * .
Our previous argument bounds the probability of all N (k) for k outside of a good range G = (k * − n/2, k * ], and our offline guarantee bounds the probability of F (k) for any k ∈ G as long as the data are drawn according to the change-point model. Then the overall probability of a bad event can be bounded as follows, where the probability is over the X drawn from P0 and P1 with change-point k * and of the randomness of the algorithm:
The first summation is at most β/2 by our previous arguments. By instantiation of Theorem 5 for OfflinePCPD with a β/(2n) and /2, the second summation is also bounded by β/2 when α = max{ 
Numerical studies
We now report the results of Monte Carlo experiments designed to validate the theoretical results of previous sections. We only consider our accuracy guarantees because the nature of differential privacy provides a strong worst-case guarantee for all hypothetical databases, and therefore is impractical and redundant to test empirically. Our simulations consider both offline and online settings for two canonical problems: detecting a change in the mean of Bernoulli and Gaussian distributions. We begin with the offline setting to verify performance of our OfflinePCPD algorithm. We use n = 200 observations where the true change occurs at time k * = 100. This process is repeated 10 4 times. For both the Bernoulli and Gaussian models, we consider the following three different change scenarios, corresponding to the size of the change and parameter selection for OfflinePCPD. For each of these cases, we consider privacy parameter = 0.1, 0.5, 1, ∞, where = ∞ corresponds to the non-private problem, which serves as our baseline. The results are summarized in Figure 1 Figure 1 highlights three positive results for our algorithm when data is drawn from Bernoulli or Gaussian distributions: accuracy is best when the true change in data is large (plots a and d) compared to small (plots b and e), accuracy deteriorates as decreases for stronger privacy, and the algorithm performs well even when the true change is larger than that hypothesized (plots c and f). This figure emphasizes that our algorithm performs well even for quite strong privacy guarantees ( < 1). The misspecified change experiments bolster our theoretical results substantially, indicating that our hypotheses can be quite far from the distributions of the true data and our algorithms will still identify a change-point accurately. We also run Monte Carlo simulations of our online change-point detection algorithm OnlinePCPD, when the data points arrive sequentially and the true change occurs at time k * = 5000. We choose the appropriate threshold T by setting a constraint that an algorithm must have positive and negative false alarm rates both at most 0.1. The range of threshold T for the online algorithm needs to be non-empty, which impacts our choice of sliding window size n. Unfortunately the window size of n = 200 used in the offline simulations is not sufficient for our online examples. A larger window size is needed to detect smaller changes or under higher levels of noise. For this reason, we choose window size n = 700 and restrict our online simulations to the large change scenario (A) and privacy parameters = 0.5, 1, ∞.
For the online simulations, we use several key ideas in Section 4 to speed up the numerical search of the threshold T . On the one hand, the threshold T cannot be too small, otherwise a false alarm will be likely. To control the false alarm rate of 0.10 with up to k * = 5000 sliding windows, a conservative lower bound of the threshold T is the 1 − 0.10/5000 = 0.99998 quantile of the noisy versions of Wn with n = 700 under the pre-change distribution. On the other hand, the threshold T cannot be too large, otherwise it will fail to detect a true change in any sliding windows of size n = 700. A useful upper bound of the threshold T is the 10% quantile of the noisy versions of CUSUM statistics Wn = max 1≤k≤n k with n = 700 when the change occurs at time 350, since it will guarantee that the online algorithms raise an alarm with probability at least 0.9 during the time interval [4650, 5350] .
Next, we simulate 10 6 realizations of the CUSUM statistics Wn = max 1≤k≤n k with n = 700 in both the pre-change and post-change cases. In each case, we speed up the computation of Wi by using the recursive form Wi = max Wi−1, 0 + log(P1(Xi)/P0(Xi)) for i ≥ 1. The empirical quantiles of the noisy versions of Wn with n = 700 under the pre-and post-change cases will yield the lower and upper bounds of the threshold T . When the range of the threshold T is non-empty, we choose one that is closest to the upper bound. For the Bernoulli model, we use T = 220 for all values of = 0.5, 1, ∞. In the Gaussian model, our window size n = 700 is not sufficient to ensure non-empty range of T under false alarm rate 0.2 for = 0.5, 1, so we relax the false alarm constraints for these values and choose T = 180, 150, 100 for = 0.5, 1, ∞, respectively. Figure 2 summarizes our online simulations results for both Bernoulli and Gaussian models using a sliding window size n = 700 to detect a large change (scenario A) that occurs at time k * = 5000. Suppose our online algorithm raises an alarm at time j with the estimated change-pointkj for the sliding window of the observations, {xj−n+1, · · · , xj}. Two probabilities are plotted: one is the marginal probability of inaccurate estimation and false alarm, β1 = Pr(|kj − k * | > α or k * / ∈ (j − n + 1, j)), and the other is the conditional probability of inaccurate estimation conditioned on raising an alarm correctly, β2 = Pr(|kj − k * | > α|j − n + 1 ≤ k * ≤ j). As α → ∞, the probability β1 becomes the false alarm rate plus the error rate related to the Laplace noise in hypothesis testing. For both Bernoulli and Gaussian models, the right-hand side plots in Figure 2 (b and d) suggest that the online accuracy conditioned on correctly raising an alarm is very similar to the offline accuracy. Our plots show that the primary challenge in the online setting is determining when to raise an alarm in a sequence of sliding windows of observations. Once such window is identified correctly, the offline estimation algorithm can be used to accurately estimate the change-point. Figure 2: Probability of inaccurate estimation and false alarm (left) and probability of accurate report conditioned on raising an alarm correctly (right) for Monte Carlo simulations with Bernoulli and Gaussian data. Each simulation involves 10 6 runs of OnlinePCPD with window size n = 700 and varying on data generated by i.i.d. samples from appropriate distributions with change point k * = 5000.
